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            The U.S. corporate governance system has recently been heavily criticized, largely as a 
result of failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and some other prominent companies.  Those 
failures and criticisms, in turn, have served as catalysts for legislative change (Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002) and regulatory change (new corporate governance listing standards from the NYSE 
and NASDAQ).   In this paper, we consider two questions.  First, is it clear that the U.S. system 
has performed that poorly; is it really that bad?  Second, will the changes lead to an improved 
U.S. corporate governance system?  We first note that the broad evidence is not consistent with a 
failed U.S. system. The U.S. economy and stock market have performed well both on an absolute 
basis and relative to other countries over the past two decades.  And the U.S. stock market 
continued to outperform other broad indices after the scandals broke.  Our interpretation of the 
evidence is that while parts of the U.S. corporate governance system failed under the exceptional 
strain of the 1990s, the overall system, which includes oversight by the public and the 
government, reacted quickly to address the problems.  We then consider the effects that the 
legislative, regulatory, and market responses are likely to have in the near future.  Our 
assessment is that they are likely to make a good system better, though there is a danger of 
overreacting to extreme events.   
   1
The State of U.S. Corporate Governance 2004 
 




To a casual observer, the United States corporate governance system must seem to be in 
terrible shape.  The business press has focused relentlessly on the corporate board and 
governance failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Global Crossing, Healthsouth, the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and others.  Top executive compensation is also routinely 
criticized as excessive by the press, academics, and even top Federal Reserve officials.
1  These 
failures and concerns, in turn, have served as catalysts for legislative change – in the form of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 – and regulatory change, including new corporate governance 
listing standards from the NYSE and NASDAQ.    
The turmoil and the responses to it suggest two important questions that we attempt to 
answer in this article.  First, has the U.S. corporate governance system performed that poorly -- is 
it really that bad?  Second, will the proposed changes lead to a more effective system? 
In addressing the first question, we begin by examining two broad measures of economic 
performance for evidence of failure of the U.S. system.  Despite the alleged flaws in its 
governance system, the U.S. economy has performed very well, both on an absolute basis and 
particularly relative to other countries.  U.S. productivity gains in the past decade have been 
exceptional, and the U.S. stock market has consistently outperformed other world indices over 
the last two decades, including the period since the scandals broke.  In other words, the broad 
evidence is not consistent with a failed U.S. system.  If anything, it suggests a system that is well 
above average. 
Next, we discuss how important aspects of the U.S. corporate governance system have 
evolved over the last two decades and the implications of those changes.  Again, contrary to the 
popular impression, the major changes in U.S. corporate governance in the past 20 years – the 
dramatic increase in equity-based pay, the institutionalization of U.S. shareholders, and the 
                                                 
1 For example, see Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailsa Roell, “Corporate Governance and Control,” in 
Handbook of Economics and Finance (G. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. Stulz, eds.). North Holland (2002), 
“CEOs Are Overpaid, Says Fed Banker,” The Washington Post, September 11, 2002, and “After 10 Years, 
Corporate Oversight Is Still Dismal,” by Claudia Deutsch, The New York Times, January 26, 2003.    2
increased independence of boards – appear to have been positive overall.  Such changes likely 
played an important role in the productive restructuring of U.S. corporations that took place 
during the 1980s and 1990s.   
But the changes did have an unfortunate side effect.  In particular, the rise of equity-
based pay and the run-up in stock prices in the late 1990s created incentives for the shortsighted 
and at times illegal managerial behavior that has attracted so much criticism.  Our view is that 
the costs associated with such incentives and behavior have been outweighed by the benefits. 
Having addressed where the U.S. system is today and how it got there, we finally 
consider the probable near- and longer-term effects of the legislative, regulatory, and market 
responses to the perceived governance problems.  We conclude that the current changes are 
likely to make a good U.S. system a better one, although not without imposing some unnecessary 
costs.  In fact, the greatest risk now facing the U.S. corporate governance system is the 
possibility of overregulation. 
 
2. How Bad Is U.S. Corporate Governance?  
 
Given the volume and intensity of criticism of U.S. corporate governance, one would 
think that the U.S. stock market must have performed quite badly, particularly since the scandals 
broke in 2001.   But, the data summarized in Table 1 indicate otherwise.  Table 1 reports the total 
returns (measured in dollars) to the Morgan Stanley Capital International indices for the 
aggregate U.S., European, and Pacific stock markets over five different time periods through the 
end of 2002 (after Sarbanes-Oxley had gone into effect). 
Although the U.S. stock market had negative returns over 2001 and 2002, it performed 
well relative to other stock markets, both in the near-term and over the longer-term.  In fact, the 
U.S. market generated returns at least as high as those of the European and Pacific markets 
during each of the five time periods considered – since 2001, since 1997, since 1992, since 1987, 
and since 1982 through 2002.  Over that period, the returns to the U.S. stock market also 
compare favorably to the returns of the stock markets of the larger individual countries 
(including France, Germany, Great Britain, and Japan) that make up the indices.  In 2003, the 
European and Pacific markets outperformed the U.S. market.  The performance of the U.S.   3
market, however, remained superior to both its European and Pacific counterparts since 1987, 
1992, and 1997. 
Because many factors affect stock returns (including currency movements as we saw in 
2003), it would be inappropriate to claim that superior U.S. corporate governance explains the 
differences in returns.  We can conclude, however, that whatever the shortcomings of the U.S. 
corporate governance system, they have not caused the stock returns of U.S. companies to under-
perform those of the rest of the world. 
It is worth pointing out two additional implications of the stock performance results.  
First, the returns to U.S. stocks were at least as large as the returns to European and Pacific 
stocks from the start of 2001 to the end of 2002, the period in which the U.S. corporate 
governance scandals first emerged and the U.S. system responded.  One possible explanation is 
that the effects of the governance scandals on U.S. stock values have not been particularly large 
relative to other factors that have weighed on most national economies.  Another possibility is 
that while there may be some problems with the U.S. corporate governance system, the problems 
confronting the governance systems of other nations are even worse.  But in our view, the most 
plausible explanation is that while parts of the U.S. system failed under the exceptional strain of 
the 1990s’ boom market, the damage was limited because the overall system reacted quickly to 
address the problems. 
The second important point to keep in mind about stock returns is that they reflect 
publicly available information about executive compensation.  Returns, therefore, are measured 
net of executive compensation payments.  The fact that the shareholders of U.S. companies have 
earned higher returns even after payments to management does not support the claim that the 
U.S. executive pay system is designed inefficiently; if anything, shareholders appear better off 
with the U.S. system of executive pay than with the systems that prevail in other countries.  As 
we discuss later, however, the higher U.S. returns do not rule out the possibility that some top 
U.S. executives are paid more than is necessary for incentive purposes and that our incentive pay 
system can be improved.    
Overall country productivity provides another broad measure of performance.  Again, 
one might expect a less effective corporate governance system to lead to lower productivity 
growth.  Table 2 presents calculations of the percentage change in GDP per capita for developed 
countries since 1982.  The results do not suggest the presence of an ineffective U.S. governance   4
system.  From the beginning of 1992 to the end of 2000,
2 growth in GDP per capita was greater 
in the U.S. than in France, Germany, Great Britain, or Japan.  And given the remarkably strong 
U.S. productivity numbers since the end of 2000, this gap has probably widened since then. 
  Again, these results do not necessarily demonstrate that the U.S. corporate governance 
system is the principal cause of the larger productivity improvements.  Many other forces operate 
at the same time.  The results do suggest, however, that any deficiencies in the U.S. corporate 
governance system have not prevented the U.S. economy from outperforming its global 
competitors.   
 
3. Changes In U.S. Corporate Governance Over The Last 20 Years
3 
 
Corporate governance in the U.S. has changed dramatically since 1980.  As a number of 
business and finance scholars have pointed out, the corporate governance structures in place 
before the 1980s gave the managers of large public U.S. corporations little reason to make 
shareholder interests their primary focus.  Before 1980, corporate managements tended to think 
of themselves as representing not the shareholders, but rather “the corporation.”  In this view, the 
goal of the firm was not to maximize shareholder wealth, but to ensure the growth (or at least the 
stability) of the enterprise by “balancing” the claims of all important corporate “stakeholders”--
employees, suppliers, and local communities, as well as shareholders.
4   
The external governance mechanisms available to dissatisfied shareholders were seldom 
used.  Raiders and hostile takeovers were relatively uncommon.  Proxy fights were rare and 
didn’t have much chance of succeeding.   And corporate boards tended to be cozy with and 
dominated by management, making board oversight weak.   
Internal incentives from management ownership of stock and options were also modest.  
For example, in 1980 only 20% of the compensation of U.S. CEOs was tied to stock market 
                                                 
2 This is the most recent period for which data are available. 
3 This section summarizes some of the arguments in Bengt Holmstrom and Steven Kaplan, “Corporate Governance 
and Takeovers in the U.S.:  Making Sense of the ’80s and ’90s,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp. 121-144 
(Spring 2001) and Steven Kaplan, “The Evolution of U.S. Corporate Governance:  We Are All Henry Kravis Now,” 
Journal of Private Equity, pp. 7-14 (1997). 
4 See Gordon Donaldson and Jay Lorsch, Decision Making at the Top (Basic Books, New York, 1983), and Michael 
Jensen, “The Modern Industrial Revolution,” Journal of Finance, pp. 831-880 (1993).   5
performance.
5   Long-term performance plans were widely used, but they were typically based 
on accounting measures like sales growth and earnings per share that tied managerial incentives 
less directly, and sometimes not at all, to shareholder value. 
Partly in response to the neglect of shareholders, the 1980s ushered in a large wave of 
takeover and restructuring activity.  This activity was distinguished by its use of hostility and 
aggressive leverage.  The 1980s saw the emergence of the corporate raider and hostile takeovers.  
Raiders like Carl Icahn and T. Boone Pickens became household names.  Nearly half of all major 
U.S. corporations received a takeover offer in the 1980s – and many companies that were not 
taken over responded to hostile pressure with internal restructurings that made themselves less 
attractive targets.
6 
The use of debt financing by U.S. companies was so extensive that, from 1984 to 1990, 
more than $500 billion of equity was retired (net of new equity issuances), as  many firms 
repurchased their own shares, borrowed to finance takeovers, or were taken private in leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs).  As a result, corporate leverage ratios increased substantially.  Leveraged 
buyouts were extreme in this respect, with debt levels typically exceeding 80% of total capital.   
  In the 1990s, the pattern of corporate governance activity changed again. After a steep 
but brief drop in merger activity around 1990, takeovers rebounded to the levels of the 1980s. 
Hostility and leverage, however, declined substantially.  At the same time, other corporate 
governance mechanisms began to play a larger role, particularly executive stock options and the 
greater involvement of boards of directors and shareholders. 
The preponderance of the evidence is consistent with an overall explanation as follows:  
In the early 1980s, the wedge between actual and potential corporate performance became 
increasingly apparent.  In some cases, changes in markets, technology, or regulation led to a 
large amount of excess capacity--for example, in the oil and tire industries.  In others, it became 
apparent that diversification strategies carried out in the late ’60s and ’70s were 
underperforming.
7  The top managers of such companies, however, were slow to respond to 
opportunities to increase value.  As mentioned above, limited ownership of stock and options 
                                                 
5 See Brian Hall and Jeffrey Liebman, “Are CEOs Really Paid like Bureaucrats?”  Quarterly Journal of Economics,  
112, pp. 653-691 (1998). 
6 See Mark Mitchell and Harold Mulherin, “The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring 
Activity,” Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 193-229 (1996). 
7 See Jensen (1993), cited earlier, and Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “The Takeover Wave of the 1980s,” 
Science, 249, August 17, pp. 745-749 (1990).   6
gave managers little monetary incentive to make major changes that might weaken their 
“partnership” with other corporate stakeholders.  But perhaps equally important, some corporate 
leaders persisted in their conviction that growth and stability were the “right” corporate goals and 
simply refused to believe what the capital markets were telling them.  This appears to have been 
true, for example, of the U.S. oil industry in the early 1980s, when oil companies traded below 
the value of their oil holdings because of industry-wide overinvestment in exploration.   
  At the same time many U.S. companies were failing to maximize value, the U.S. capital 
markets were becoming more powerful because of increased stock ownership by large 
institutions.  It was the potential for improved corporate performance combined with the 
increased ownership of institutional investors that gave birth to the takeovers, junk bonds, and 
LBOs of the 1980s.   In some cases, the capital markets reversed ill-advised diversification 
through “bust-up” transactions (such as KKR’s acquisition of Beatrice Foods in 1986).  In other 
cases, the financial markets effectively forced managers to eliminate excess capacity (as in 
Chevron’s leveraged acquisition of Gulf Oil in 1984).  More generally, the capital markets 
disciplined managers who had ignored shareholders for the benefit of themselves and other 
stakeholders.  As we discuss below, the incentive and governance features of LBOs are 
particularly representative of the discipline that the capital markets imposed. 
  The initial response of U.S. executives was to fight takeovers with legal maneuvers and 
to attempt to enlist political and popular support against corporate raiders.  Over time, these 
efforts met with some legislative, regulatory, and judicial success.  As a result, hostile takeovers 
became more costly in the 1990s than in the previous decade.   
But the accomplishments of the 1980s were by no means forgotten.  By the 1990s, U.S. 
managers, boards, and institutional shareholders had seen what LBOs and other market-driven 
restructurings could do.  With the implicit assent of institutional investors, boards substantially 
increased the use of stock option plans that allowed managers to share in the value created by 
restructuring their own companies.  Shareholder value thus became an ally rather than a threat.   
This general embrace of shareholder value helps to explain why restructurings continued 
at a high rate in the 1990s, but for the most part on amicable terms.  There was also less of a need 
for high leverage because deals could now be paid for with stock with less investor concern that 
managers would pursue their own objectives at the expense of shareholders.   
The merger wave of the 1990s also appears to have had a somewhat different purpose   7
than the wave of the 1980s, representing a different stage in the overall restructuring process.  
The deals of the 1980s were more of a bust-up wave whose main effect was to force corporate 
assets out of the hands of managers who could not or would not use them efficiently.  The 
transactions of the 1990s, by contrast, had more of a “build-up” effect in which assets were 
reconfigured to take advantage of growth opportunities in new technologies and markets.  This 
logic also fits with the increased use of equity rather than debt in funding the deals of the 1990s.   
The move toward shareholder value and increased capital market influence has also been 
apparent in the way corporations have reorganized themselves.  For example, there has been a 
broad trend toward decentralization.  Large companies have been working hard to become more 
nimble and to find ways to offer employees higher-powered incentives.  At the same time, 
external capital markets have taken on a larger role in capital reallocation, as evidenced by the 
large volume of mergers and divestitures throughout the ’90s.  During the same period, the 
amounts of funds raised and invested by U.S. venture capitalists – who help perform the key 
economic function of transferring funds from mature to new high-growth industries – also 
increased by an order of magnitude over the 1990s.
 8   
In sum,  while corporate managers still reallocate vast amounts of resources in the 
economy through internal capital and labor markets, the boundary between markets and 
managers appears to have shifted.  As managers have ceded authority to the markets, the scope 
and independence of their decision-making have narrowed.   
We now focus more specifically on changes in three key elements of the U.S. (and indeed 
any) corporate governance system:  executive compensation, shareholders, and boards of 
directors.   
 
Changes in Executive Compensation 
The total pay of top U.S. executives, particularly option-based compensation, has 
increased substantially over the last two decades.  Hall and Liebman (1998) found that the 
average compensation of CEOs of large U.S. companies tripled in real terms during the 15-year 
period from 1980 to 1994.  In their study, the average annual CEO option grant (valued at 
issuance) increased roughly sevenfold and, as a result, equity-based compensation in 1994 made 
                                                 
8 See Raghu Rajan and Julie Wulf, “The Flattening Firm,” working paper, University of Chicago (2002), and Paul 
Gompers and Josh Lerner, “The Venture Capital Revolution,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, (2001).   8
up almost 50% of total CEO compensation (up from less than 20% in 1980).
9  In a more recent 
study, Hall and Murphy (2002) find that this trend continued from 1994 to 2001, with CEO pay 
more than doubling and option-based compensation increasing at an even faster rate.
10    
Overall, then, CEO compensation appears to have increased by a factor of six over the 
last two decades, with a disproportionate increase in equity-based compensation.  The effect of 
the increase in equity-based compensation has been to increase CEO pay-to-performance 
sensitivities by a factor of more than ten times from 1980 to 2001.
11    
These increases in executive compensation, particularly options, have generated 
enormous controversy.  The recent scandals and stock market declines have led some observers 
to argue that such increases represent unmerited transfers of shareholder wealth to top executives 
with limited if any beneficial incentive effects.  For example, one recent survey of corporate 
governance concludes: “It is widely recognized…that these options are at best an inefficient 
financial incentive and at worst create new incentive or conflict-of-interest problems of their 
own.”
12   
There are several reasons to be skeptical of these conclusions.  First, as we have already 
pointed out, the performance of the U.S. stock market and the strong growth in U.S. productivity 
provide no support for such arguments.   
Second, the primary effect of the large shift to equity-based compensation has been to 
align the interests of CEOs and their management teams with shareholders’ interests to a much 
greater extent than in the past.  Large stock option grants fundamentally changed the mind-set of 
CEOs and made them more receptive to value-increasing transactions.  The tenfold increase in 
pay-for-performance sensitivities implies that a one dollar increase in a company’s stock price 
was ten times more valuable to a CEO at the end of the 1990s than at the beginning of the 1980s.  
                                                 
9 Hall and Liebman (1998), cited earlier. 
10 See Brian Hall and Kevin Murphy, “Stock Options for Undiversified Executives,” Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, pp. 3-42 (2002) and Brian Hall, “Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay,” in this issue of the 
JACF. 
11 The levels of executive compensation and managerial equity ownership appear to be high not only relative to 
1980, but also relative to earlier periods.  Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan compare equity ownership by officers 
and directors in 1935 and 1995 and find that equity ownership was substantially greater in 1995 than in 1935.  See 
Cliff Holderness, Randall Kroszner, and Dennis Sheehan, “Were the Good Old That Good?  Changes in Managerial 
Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression,” Journal of Finance, pp. 435-470 (1999). 
12 See Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailsa Roell, (2002), ibid.  See also, Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and David 
Walker, “Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation,” University of Chicago 
Law Review, pp. 751-846 (2002).   9
As we noted earlier, this shift likely played a significant role in the continued restructuring of 
corporations in the 1990s.
13  It also helps explain the 1997 decision of the Business Roundtable – 
a group of 200 CEOs of the largest American companies – to change its position on business 
objectives (after years of opposition and ambivalence to shareholder value) to read “the 
paramount duty of management and the board is to the shareholder and not to...other 
stakeholders.”    
A third reason to be skeptical of the criticism of U.S. top executive pay practices is that 
both buyout investors and venture capital investors have made, and continue to make, substantial 
use of equity-based and option compensation in the firms they invest in.   A 1989 study by one of 
the authors reported that the CEOs of companies taken private in LBOs increased their 
ownership stake by more than a factor of four, from an average of 1.4% before the LBO to 6.4% 
after.  The study also found that management teams as a whole typically obtained 10% to 20% of 
the post-buyout equity.
14  More recent research and anecdotal evidence suggest that such levels 
of managerial equity ownership are still typical in today’s buyout transactions.
15 
This feature of LBOs is particularly notable.  LBO sponsor firms such as KKR, Texas 
Pacific Group, and Thomas Lee typically buy majority control of the companies they invest in 
through the partnerships that the sponsors manage.  The individual partners of the LBO sponsors 
have strong incentives to make profitable investments since the sponsors typically receive 20% 
of the profits of a particular buyout partnership, and the sponsors’ ability to raise other funds is 
strongly related to the performance of their existing investments.
16  The fact that such sponsors 
also insist on providing the managers of their companies with high-powered incentives suggests 
that incentives have been a critical ingredient in the success of LBOs. 
Two other aspects of compensation contracts designed by LBO sponsors for the top 
executives of their portfolio companies are worth mentioning.  First, the equity and options held 
by those top executives are typically illiquid--usually by necessity because most of the 
                                                 
13 For additional evidence consistent with this conclusion, see John Core and David Larcker, “Performance 
Consequences of Mandatory Increases in Executive Stock Ownership,” Journal of Financial Economics (2002), 
who find that option grants or increases in equity ownership are related to improvements in stock and accounting 
performance.   
14 See Steven Kaplan, “The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operations and Value,” Journal of Financial 
Economics, pp. 217-254 (1989). 
15 P. Rogers, T. Holland, and D. Haas, “Value Acceleration: Lessons from Private-Equity Masters,” Harvard 
Business Review, June (2002). 
16 See Steven Kaplan and Antoinette Schoar, “Private Equity Returns:  Persistence and Capital Flows,” working 
paper, University of Chicago, December (2002).   10
companies are private--unless and until the company has clearly succeeded through an IPO or a 
sale to another company.  This means that top management cannot trade in and out of the stock 
(nor can it easily hedge its positions).  Second, neither LBO sponsors nor venture capitalists 
typically index the executive compensation contracts they employ to industry performance or 
market performance.  If non-indexed options and equity grants were so inefficient, as critics of 
executive compensation have argued, we would expect to see more indexing of private equity 
contracts.   
Unfortunately, while the greater use of stock-based compensation has likely been a 
positive development overall, critics of the U.S. governance system are correct in pointing out 
that higher-powered incentives have not come without costs.
 17   
First, as executive stock and option ownership have increased, so has the incentive to 
manage and manipulate accounting numbers in order to inflate stock market values and sell 
shares at those inflated values.
 18  This arguably was important in the cases of Enron, Global 
Crossing and WorldCom, among others.   
Second, and related to the first, much of the compensation of top U.S. executives is fairly 
liquid and, as we argue below, considerably more liquid than shareholders would like it to be.  
Unlike LBO sponsors, boards typically have not put strong restrictions on the ability of top 
executives to unwind their equity-based compensation by exercising options, selling shares, or 
using derivatives to hedge their positions.  Finding a workable solution to the problem of optimal 
liquidity for top executive compensation is an important challenge faced by today’s boards. 
Third, most options are issued at the money because accounting rules do not require the 
cost of such options to be expensed.  It is plausible that because the cost of the options does not 
appear as an expense, some boards of directors underestimate the options’ cost.  It is undeniable 
that the size of some of the option grants has been far greater than what is necessary to retain and 
motivate the CEOs.  In 2001, for example, the ten most highly rewarded CEOs in the S&P 500 
                                                 
17 Other critiques are offered in Lucien Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and David Walker, “Managerial Power and Rent 
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation,” University of Chicago Law Review 69 (2002), pp. 751-846, 
Becht, Bolton, and Roell, (2002) ibid., Brian Hall “Equity-Pay Design for Executives,” working paper, Harvard 
Business School (2002), and Tod Perry and Marc Zenner “CEO Compensation In The 1990s: Shareholder 
Alignment Or Shareholder Expropriation?” Wake Forest Law Review (2001).  
18 See Jeremy Stein “Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior,”  
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104, pp. 655-669 (1989) for a model explaining this behavior.  See also 
Joseph Fuller and Michael Jensen, “Just Say No to Wall Street,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 14 No. 
4 (2002).   11
were granted option packages with an estimated average value (at time of grant) of $170 million 
per person.  Even if some of these grants represent multiyear awards, the amounts are still 
staggering.  It is particularly disconcerting that among the executives receiving the largest grants 
in the past three years, several already owned large amounts of stock, including Larry Ellison of 
Oracle, Tom Siebel of Siebel Systems, and Steve Jobs of Apple.  It is hard to argue that these 
people need stronger shareholder incentives.  An obvious explanation is that they have been able 
to use their positions of power to command excessive awards. 
Even so, it would be a mistake to condemn the entire system based on a few cases.  That 
such cases are far from representative can be seen from the pronounced skew in the distribution 
of CEO incomes.  In 2001, for example, the same year the top ten U.S. CEOs received average 
option grants of $170 million, the median value of total compensation for CEOs of S&P 500 
companies was about $7 million.  Thus, U.S. executive pay may not be quite the runaway train 
that has been portrayed in the press.
19 
 
Changes in Shareholders 
As mentioned above, the composition of U.S. shareholders also has changed significantly 
over the past two decades.  Large institutional investors own an increasingly large share of the 
overall stock market.  For example, from 1980 to 1996, large institutional investors nearly 
doubled their share of ownership of U.S. corporations from less than 30% to more than 50%.   
(Conversely, individual ownership declined from 70% in 1970, to 60% in 1980, and to 48% in 
1994.
20)   
There are at least two reasons public company shareholders are likely to monitor 
management more effectively today than in the 1980s.  First, the large increase in the 
shareholdings of institutional investors means that professional investors – who have strong 
incentives to generate greater stock returns and are presumably more sophisticated – own an 
increasingly large fraction of U.S. corporations.  
Second, in 1992 the SEC substantially reduced the costs to shareholders of challenging 
management teams.  Under the old rules, a shareholder had to file a detailed proxy statement 
                                                 
19 A part of the problem is that the press has traditionally reported the value of exercised options instead of the value 
of options at the time they have been granted. This is changing, too.   12
with the SEC before talking to more than ten other shareholders.  Under the new rules, 
shareholders can essentially communicate at any time and in any way as long as they send a copy 
of the substance of the communication to the SEC afterward.  The rule change has lowered the 
cost of coordinating shareholder actions and blocking management proposals.  (Not surprisingly, 
the Business Roundtable and other management organizations were extremely hostile to this rule 
change when it was proposed.) 
Consistent with these two changes, shareholder activism has increased in the U.S. since 
the late 1980s.  The evidence on the impact of such activism, however, is mixed.  For example, a 
1998 summary of the results of 20 empirical studies of the effects of formal shareholder 
proposals and private negotiations with managements reported evidence of small or no effects on 
shareholder value.
21  When interpreting such evidence, however, it is important to keep in mind 
the difficulty of measuring the extent and effects of shareholder activity, in part because so much 
of this activity takes place behind the scenes and is not reported.  And the fact that a recent study 
reported that stock returns over the period 1980-1996 were higher for companies with greater 
institutional ownership suggests that our large institutions may indeed be playing a valuable 
monitoring role – one that translates into higher stock prices.
22 
 
Changes in Boards of Directors 
In an influential study of U.S. corporate boards in the second half of the 1980s, Jay 
Lorsch and Elizabeth MacIver pointed out a number of deficiencies and offered several 
recommendations.  Chief among them were the following: (1) board selection by a nominating 
committee rather than the CEO; (2) more equity compensation for directors; and (3) more 
director control of board meetings through appointment of a lead director or outside chairman, 
annual CEO reviews, and regular sessions with outside directors only (“executive sessions”).
23  
Since the publication of that study in 1989, the boards of U.S. companies have made 
progress in implementing all three of these recommendations.  U.S. companies have significantly 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 See Paul Gompers and Andrew Metrick, “Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, ” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (2001), and James Poterba and Andrew Samwick, “Stock Ownership Patterns, Stock Market 
Fluctuations, and Consumption,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 295-357 (1995). 
21 Jonathan Karpoff, “The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target Companies: A Survey of Empirical Findings,” 
Working paper, University of Washington (1998). 
22 Paul Gompers and Andrew Metrick, “Institutional Investors and Equity Prices,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 116 (1), 2001, pp. 229-260. 
23 Jay Lorsch and Elizabeth MacIver, Pawns or Potentates. Harvard Business School Press (1989).   13
expanded the use of nominating committees and lead directors.  Executive sessions became 
increasingly common (although, as suggested below, not as common as directors would have 
liked).  Boards of U.S. companies now include a larger percentage of independent and outside 
directors, and have become somewhat smaller over time (smaller boards are thought to be more 
effective in disciplining CEOs and tend to be associated with higher valuations).
24  A l s o  
encouraging, directors today receive a significantly larger amount of their total compensation in 
the form of stock or options.  For example, one study reported that stock-based directors’ 
compensation increased from 25% in 1992 to 39% in 1995, and that trend has since continued.
25 
  The CEO turnover process – one of the most widely used measures of the effectiveness 
of a governance system – suggests that the CEO labor market has become broader and, arguably, 
more efficient.  One recent study of CEO turnover for large companies from 1971 to 1994 found 
a marked increase in both forced CEO departures and the hiring of new CEOs from outside the 
company.  Within the study, the incidence of forced turnovers and outside succession was 
highest from 1989 to 1994,
26 a trend that also appears to have continued.  The same study 
reported that CEO turnover was more sensitive to poor performance – as measured by reductions 
in operating income – during the 1989-1994 period than in earlier years.
27, 28 
On the negative side, however, anti-takeover measures such as poison pills and staggered 
boards have increased substantially in the past two decades.  And recent research finds that over 
the 1990s, companies with a high level of anti-shareholder provisions experienced substantially 
lower returns than firms with a low level of such provisions.
29 
Despite the improvements noted above, the events at companies like Enron, Tyco, and 
WorldCom suggest that the boards of U.S. companies continue to exhibit less than the optimal 
                                                 
24 See David Yermack, “Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 40, 1996, pp. 185-202. 
25 For a summary of these changes, see Ben Hermalin and Michael Weisbach, “Boards of Directors as an 
Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature,” Economic Policy Review (2003). 
26 See M. Huson, Robert Parrino, and Laura Starks, “Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-
Term Perspective,” Journal of Finance, pp. 2,265-2,297 (2001). 
27 On the other hand, Murphy (1999) finds that CEO turnover is less sensitive to industry-adjusted stock 
performance from 1990 to 1995 than in earlier years. Kevin J. Murphy, “Executive Compensation.”  In O. 
Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics.  North Holland, pp. 2,485-2,525 (1999). 
28 Rakesh Khurana in Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for Charismatic CEOs, Princeton 
University Press (2002) has argued that the CEO labor market is flawed because it is overly focused on outsider, 
charismatic CEOs.  The operating performance evidence in Rakesh Khurana and Nitin Nohria, “The Effects of CEO 
Turnover in Large Industrial Corporations: A Study of the Fortune 200 from 1978-1993,” Harvard Business School 
(1997), however, is not consistent with such a conclusion.   14
amount of independence and oversight.  The Senate report on Enron’s board was particularly 
critical in this respect.  When a company is not doing well, everyone pays close attention--
lenders and investors as well as board members.  But when a company appears to be doing well, 
as was the case with both Enron and Tyco, investors and the board are likely to be less critical.     
A survey of more than 2,000 directors by Korn Ferry in early 2002 (and thus before the 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and the issuance of the new NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules) is 
very interesting in this regard.  The directors who responded to the survey consistently favored 
more monitoring than was the practice on the boards on which they served.  For example, 
although 71% of the directors said they believed boards should hold executive sessions without 
the CEO, only 45% said their boards actually did so.  And whereas almost 60% felt their boards 
should have a lead director, only 37% reported that their boards had one. 
Our bottom line on boards, then, is that the structure and operating procedures of U.S. 
corporate boards have improved since the 1980s, but they are still far from perfect. 
 
International Developments  
Indirect evidence of the effectiveness of the U.S. governance system is provided by 
changes in corporate governance in other countries.  In recent years, as the forces of 
deregulation, globalization, and information technology have continued to sweep across the 
world economy, other countries have begun to move toward the U.S. model.   Traditionally, 
European and Japanese firms have reallocated capital from sunset industries to sunrise industries 
mainly through internal diversification.  External market interventions of the sort seen in the U.S. 
were almost unheard of.  In the late 1990s, however, Europe experienced a sudden rise in hostile 
takeovers.  In 1999 alone, 34 listed companies in Continental Europe received hostile bids, 
representing a total value of $406 billion (as compared to 52 bids for just $69 billion over the 
entire period 1990-1998).
30  These transactions included Vodafone’s bid for Mannesmann, 
TotalFina’s bid for Elf Aquitaine, and Olivetti’s bid for Telecom Italia.  
Shareholder activism has also been on the rise, with strong support from American 
institutional investors.  For example, Telecom Italia’s attempt to split off its wireless unit (at an 
unacceptable price) was blocked when TIAA-CREF put pressure on the Italian government.  In 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 Paul Gompers, Joy Ishi, and Andrew Metrick,  “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,” Working Paper 8,449, 
NBER, 2001.   15
France, shareholder activists managed to defeat a poison-pill proposal by Rhone-Poulenc.   
European universal banks also have begun to pay more attention to the value of their financial 
stakes than to their positions of power.  These actions appear to have been very much influenced 
by the U.S. model of market intervention and by the fact that more than $1 trillion of U.S. funds 
have been invested in Western Europe in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Another way in which companies can make use of the market to reallocate capital more 
effectively is to repurchase their own shares.  In the last several years, Japan, France, Germany, 
and several other European countries have relaxed prohibitions or restrictions on share 
repurchases, and companies in those countries have responded by buying back increasing 
numbers of shares.  Finally, the use of stock options for executives and boards has increased 
around the world.  Japan eliminated a substantial tax penalty on executive stock options and a 
2002 study based on Towers Perrin’s yearly surveys reported that the rate of adoption of stock 
options in Europe has matched that of the U.S. in the 1990s.
31 
In sum, the conventional wisdom on corporate governance has changed dramatically 
since the 1970s and early 1980s, when the U.S. market-based system was subjected to heavy 
criticism and the bank-centered systems of Japan and Germany were held up as models.
32  Since 
the mid-1980s, the American style of corporate governance has reinvented itself, and the rest of 
the world seems to have followed the U.S. lead. 
 
4. Recent Regulatory Changes 
 
  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which was enacted in the summer of 2002, mandated a 
number of changes in corporate governance for publicly traded companies.  The NYSE and 
NASDAQ also mandated corporate governance changes for firms listed on their respective 
exchanges.  In this section, we discuss the likely effect of these changes on U.S. corporate 
governance. 
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Sarbanes-Oxley 
SOX mandated changes that will affect executive compensation, shareholder monitoring, 
and, particularly, board monitoring. 
One provision requires the CEO and CFO to disgorge any profits from bonuses and stock 
sales during the 12-month period that follows a financial report that is subsequently restated 
because of “misconduct.”  (We assume this provision also covers any hedging transactions the 
CEO or CFO undertakes.)  Until “misconduct” is clearly defined, this provision increases the risk 
to a CEO or CFO of selling a large amount of stock or options in any one year while still in 
office.  Some CEOs and CFOs will choose to wait until they are no longer in those positions 
before selling equity or exercising options.  To the extent CEOs and CFOs behave this way, their 
equity holdings become less liquid and they will care less about short-term stock price 
movements.  This would be a positive change.  In addition, the rule will act as a deterrent to 
negligent or deliberate misreporting.
33   
Shareholder-related provisions include changes in restrictions on insider trading 
regulation and enhanced financial disclosure.  Executives will now have to report sales or 
purchases of company stock within two days rather than the current ten days, which will have the 
effect of making executive shares somewhat less liquid.  SOX also requires more detailed 
disclosure of off-balance-sheet financings and special purpose entities, which should make it 
more difficult for companies to manipulate their financial statements in a way that boosts the 
current stock price. 
SOX also includes a number of provisions meant to improve board monitoring.  These 
focus largely on increasing the power, responsibility, and independence of the audit committee.  
SOX requires that the audit committee hire the outside auditor and that the committee consist 
entirely of directors with no other financial relationship with the company.  This undoubtedly 
will increase the monitoring efforts and effectiveness of boards. 
Finally, SOX increases management’s and the board’s responsibility for financial 
reporting and the criminal penalties for misreporting.   The increased responsibility and penalties 
have clearly increased the amount of time that executives of all companies must spend on 
accounting matters.  For companies that are already well-governed, much of that extra time is   17
unnecessary and therefore costly.  At least initially, some of the extra time meeting SOX’s 
requirements also will be time that could have been devoted to discussing strategy or managing 
the business.  SOX has also caused companies to increase their use of outside accountants and 
lawyers.  On the positive side, the increased accountability will provide valuable new 
information about a company’s operations, assets, and liabilities to some CEOs, CFOs, and 
boards.  This information will lead to better decisions.  Furthermore, the additional time and 
costs should decline as companies become more efficient at complying with SOX.   
So, what has the new legislation really accomplished?  The provisions of SOX do deal 
both directly and indirectly with some of the deficiencies of U.S. corporate governance.  But 
some U.S. companies would have instituted some of these changes anyway.  The law already 
punished fraudulent reporting, including the misreporting uncovered in Enron, Tyco and 
WorldCom.  Furthermore, the Enron scandal brought the costs of such misreporting into sharp 
focus before the passage of SOX.   No CEO wants to be the CEO of the next Enron.  And no 
board member wants to be on the board of the next Enron. 
There are two significant additional concerns associated with SOX.  First, the ambiguity 
in some of the provisions, particularly those that overlap with and even contradict aspects of state 
corporate law, will likely invite aggressive litigation.  The fear of such litigation, in turn, may 
lead CEOs and CFOs to direct corporate resources to protect themselves against potential 
lawsuits.  The second, broader concern is that SOX represents a shift to more rigid Federal 
regulation and legislation of corporate governance  as distinguished from the more flexible 
corporate governance that has evolved from state law, particularly Delaware law.
34   
At this point, SOX has likely helped to restore confidence in the U.S. corporate 
governance system.  Apart from that, the Act’s expected overall effect is as yet unclear.  Our 
guess is that the effects will be positive for companies with poor governance practices and 
negative for companies with good governance practices.  Because some of the additional costs of 
complying with SOX are fixed rather than variable, the effects will be more negative for smaller 
companies than for larger ones.  At the margin, this may lead some public companies to go 
private and deter some private companies from going public.  And because of companies’ initial 
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However, this would have to be accomplished entirely through salary increases because cash bonuses are also 
subject to the same disgorgement provisions. 
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uncertainty about how to comply with the Act, we expect the effects of SOX to be somewhat 
negative in the short term with compliance costs declining over time.   
 
NYSE and NASDAQ Corporate Governance Rules   
  In November 2003, the SEC approved proposals by the New York Stock Exchange and 
NASDAQ designed to strengthen the corporate governance of their listed firms.  The new 
corporate governance rules require the following:   
1)  a majority of independent directors with no material relationships with the company;  
2)  a larger role for independent directors in the compensation and nominating committees 
3)  regular meetings of only non-management directors. 
  Despite the internal governance troubles of Dick Grasso and the NYSE, these new 
corporate governance rules appear to be unequivocally positive.  Compared to SOX, these 
proposals address U.S. corporate governance deficiencies both more directly and with lower 
costs.  The three provisions relating to board monitoring are particularly noteworthy in that they 
directly address some of the concerns mentioned by Lorsch and MacIver in 1989 and by outside 
directors in the Korn Ferry survey. 
The closest historical parallel to these proposals is the Code of Best Practices (based upon 
the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee) that was adopted by the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) in 1992.  The Code included recommendations that boards have at least three 
outside directors and a non-executive chairperson.  Although the Code is voluntary, the LSE 
requires companies to state whether they are in compliance.    
There is evidence that the Code can make a difference.  A recent study of all LSE 
companies reported that both CEO turnover and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance 
increased following the adoption of the Code – and that such increases were concentrated among 
those firms that had adopted the recommendations.  Furthermore, the changes in turnover appear 
to have been driven by the increase in the fraction of outsiders on the board rather than the 
separation of the chairperson and CEO.
 35 
                                                 
35 J. Dahya, J. McConnell, and Nickolaos Travlos, “The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance, and Top 
Management Turnover,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 57 (2002), pp. 461-483.   19
The Conference Board Recommendations 
In response to the recent scandals, the Conference Board – an association of prominent 
U.S. companies – put together a Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise with the aim 
of advising companies on best practices in corporate governance.  
The first report by the Commission, released in September 2002, provided a set of 
principles to guide boards in designing top executive compensation. The report begins by noting 
the exceptional circumstances that led to the abuse of stock options – the equivalent of a “Perfect 
Storm” – and then makes the following recommendations:   
1)  compensation committees should be independent and should avoid benchmarking;  
2)  performance-based compensation should correspond to the corporation’s long-term 
goals--“cost of capital, return on equity, economic value added, market share, 
environment goals etc.”--and should avoid windfalls related to stock market volatility;  
3)  equity-based compensation should be “reasonable and cost effective”;  
4)  key executives and directors should “acquire and hold” a meaningful amount of company 
stock; and  
5)  compensation disclosure should be transparent and accounting-neutral – i.e., stock 
options should be expensed.
36   
Overall, we have a mixed reaction to these recommendations.  Several are clearly 
beneficial.  In particular, greater transparency and appropriate expensing of options will make 
the costs of options more clear not only to shareholders but also to boards.  It also will “level the 
playing field” for options versus other forms of equity-based compensation.   
Requiring key executives to hold a meaningful amount of company stock will reduce the 
temptation to manipulate earnings and stock prices in the short term by making executive stock 
holdings less liquid.  Typically, stock options vest in one to four years, which is short given that 
most options are exercised and sold fairly soon after vesting.   Economic logic suggests that 
boards should encourage longer-term holdings and a build-up of sizable executive stakes.     
The Commission also endorses indexation of some kind to eliminate windfall gains. 
Indexation has been recommended by economists for a long time, yet practitioners have not 
adopted it.  It is true that there has been an important accounting disadvantage to indexation in   20
that indexed options must be expensed.  But the fact that indexed options are rarely used by LBO 
investors and venture capitalists also suggests that there are hidden costs to indexation or that the 
benefits are low.  While it may be useful to experiment with some forms of indexation, we think 
it would probably be just as effective and more transparent to index implicitly by granting stock-
based incentives more frequently and in smaller amounts.  In general, the incentives from stock 
options are more fragile than those provided by restricted stock, a problem that more frequent, 
smaller awards would help alleviate.
37 
We are also skeptical of the recommendation to use performance-based compensation 
tied to a long list of potential long-term goals, including cost of capital, return on equity, market 
share, revenue growth, and compliance and environmental protection goals.  Such performance 
plans would appear to take us back to the 1970s, an era that few incentive experts remember 
fondly.  If the problem is windfall gains, then indexed stock options or, more simply, frequent 
(quarterly) issues of stock options are much preferred.  If the problem is manipulation of the 
market, it should be evident that accounting measures of the kind endorsed by the Conference 
Board are very problematic.  It was in large part because of their vulnerability to manipulation 
that standard performance plans were replaced by stock-based incentives in the 1980s. This is 
not to say that accounting-based incentives should never be used, just that they should not form 
the core of a CEO’s incentive plan. 
We are also somewhat skeptical of the recommendation that the compensation committee 
“act independently of management…and avoid benchmarking that keeps continually raising the 
compensation levels for executives.” First, dictating terms without consulting with the executives 
about their preferences goes against efficient contracting principles; contracting is a two-sided 
affair.  Second, the intent seems to be to give individual compensation committees the 
responsibility for the overall level of executive compensation.  But it is hard to see how pay 
levels can be set in a fair and efficient way without benchmarking.  Prices, including wages, are 
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37 See Brian Hall and Thomas Knox, “Managing Option Fragility,” Harvard NOM Research Paper 02-19, Harvard 
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ultimately set by supply and demand, and benchmarking is nothing more than looking at market 
prices.  The main problem with executive pay levels is not the overall level, but the extreme 
skew in the awards, as we noted earlier. To deal with this problem, we need more effective 
benchmarking, not less of it.   
Despite good intentions, then, we see potentially serious flaws in the recommendations of 
the Conference Board.  It is also important to keep in mind that good incentive designs are 
sensitive to economic circumstances and to the desired performance.  One size does not fit all.  
And because each situation requires its own compensation plan, the need to customize that plan 
will often conflict with the goals of benchmarking and transparency. 
 
5. What Will The Future Bring? 
 
Working together with normal market forces, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the new NYSE 
and NASDAQ corporate governance rules, and the guidelines offered by groups like the 
Conference Board will significantly influence U.S. corporate governance.    
Board behavior will be strongly affected (and already has been) in that boards will 
monitor top management more aggressively.  Importantly, the new regulatory requirements 
provide cover for a more independent and inquisitive board.  Actions that in the past might have 
been construed as hostile by the CEO and top management will now be interpreted as required or 
following best practice.  The mandated changes may, in fact, help reduce the tension inherent in 
the dual role boards play as monitors of management, on the one hand, and as advisors and 
sounding boards, on the other. 
In addition to the changes in oversight and monitoring, boards also are likely to change 
their approaches to executive compensation.  Although SOX and the exchanges did not address 
executive compensation directly, large institutional shareholders will exert (greater) pressure in 
this regard.   Boards will increasingly restrict top executives from exercising options, selling 
stock, and hedging their positions.  As noted earlier, some of the incentives for the executives at 
Global Crossing, Tyco, and WorldCom to manage earnings came from their ability to sell shares 
when their stock prices were overvalued.  Restrictions on such selling reduce the incentive to 
manage short-term earnings.  While such restrictions have costs, particularly in the form of lack 
of diversification, the benefits in terms of improved incentives arguably outweigh them.  Private   22
equity firms routinely impose such restrictions on the management of their portfolio companies.  
Furthermore, CEOs typically are wealthy enough that the benefits of diversification may not be 
so great. 
Many corporate boards also will decide to expense options and equity compensation even 
if they are not required to do so.  We suspect that boards will discover that investors and the 
stock market have neutral or even positive reactions to such expensing (in contrast to the 
predictions of many executives).  Sophisticated investors already know the extent of option 
issuance from their disclosure in footnotes.  Expensing will provide the additional signal to 
sophisticated investors that the board and the company are serious about compensation and 
corporate governance.
38 
Boards of directors and compensation committees also will begin to change their 
behavior in issuing options and equity-based compensation.  This will be particularly true of 
boards that decide to expense options.  Expensing the options will make their costs more clear 
and will reduce the size of option grants, particularly large, onetime grants.  Moreover, some 
companies that do expense equity compensation will choose to issue restricted stock rather than 
options.  Restricted stock grants have the advantages of being easier to value, providing 
incentives that do not vary with stock price movements, and thus being less vulnerable to 
repricing.
39 
In the extreme, we can imagine an admittedly optimistic, but plausible scenario in which 
the new regulations, more effective compensation, and market incentives lead boards to monitor 
more effectively and corporate executives to report more accurately (if not more conservatively).  
In that scenario, negative restatements decline markedly in the future as does the litigation that 




                                                 
38 The argument that options cannot be expensed because no one knows their true value is wrong.  On that basis, one 
could argue that we should not depreciate assets because it is impossible to measure the assets’ true rate of 
depreciation. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how fluctuations in the value of stock options will influence the 
information content of reported earnings. The never-ending debate over the best way to handle depreciation suggests 
that expensing options is going to be discussed for years to come. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Despite its alleged flaws, the U.S. corporate governance system has performed very well, 
both on an absolute basis and relative to other countries.  It is important to recognize that there is 
no perfect system and that we should try to avoid the pendulum-like movement so typical of 
politically inspired system redesigns.  The current problems arose in an exceptional period that is 
not likely to happen again soon.  After all, it was almost 70 years ago that the corporate 
governance system last attracted such intervention.   
The fact that the American public and political system became outraged and involved in 
corporate governance does not mean the system was broken.  The U.S. public and the political 
system are part of the broader system of corporate governance.  At the same time, an effort to 
regulate the system so that such outrage will never again occur would be overly costly and 
counterproductive.  It would lead to inflexibility and fear of experimentation.  In today’s 
uncertain climate, we probably need more organizational experimentation than ever.  The New 
Economy is moving forward and, in order to exploit the potential efficiencies inherent in the new 
information technologies, new business models and new organizational structures are likely to be 
desirable and valuable.  Enron was an experiment that failed.  We should take advantage of its 
lessons not by withdrawing into a shell, but rather by improving control structures and corporate 
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Table 1 
 
Stock Market Performance 
Stock returns reported by Ibbotson Associates for total return on Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) Indices for the United States, Europe, Pacific, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan from 
January 1 of the given year through end of December 2002. 
 
    U . S .    Europe   Pacific 
 
From  1982  (January)   1222%   1145%   276%   
 
From 1987      436%      266%      3% 
 
From  1992    164%       113%   -27%   
 
From 1997        28%       13%    -39%  
 
From 2001       -32%     -34%    -32%   
 
 
         G r e a t  
       U . S .    Britain   France Germany Japan  
 
From 1982      1222%  1223%     1567%    595%   90%   
 
From 1987       436%    290%     236%      93%  -37%     
 
From 1992       164%    121%     147%      84%  -42%     
 
From 1997        28%      11%       47%         5%  -39%      
 




Changes in Real GDP per Capita 
Changes in real GDP per capita for the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany and Japan.  Calculated using the 
Penn World Tables. 
         G r e a t  
       U . S .    Britain   France Germany Japan  
 
From 1982 (beginning) to 2000    54%   58%    37%    44%  55%   
 
From 1987 to 2000      38%   36%    28%    29%  36%   
 
From 1992 to 2000      29%   24%    12%    12%    8%   
 
From 1997 to 2000        14%          11%      11%            8%          3%   
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